The concept of ‘intersectionality’, first coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw, has been around since 1989.   Quite a long time then?  Well, it depends on perspective.  As The Washington Post notes:

“Considering its recent prominence, it’s surprising to realize that the term has been around only since 1989.” [my emphasis]

So, a short time from the Post’s perspective.  Admittedly, I hadn’t come across the concept before 2019!  And this goes to show how quickly ‘intersectionality’ has gained ground compared to the usual speed at which new academic concepts infiltrate popular consciousness.  In the last few years intersectionality has gained rapid traction in many areas, whether through social movements like #MeToo and Black Lives Matter (BLM), or ‘affirmative action’ discussions.

For instance, the trade union I am a member of (the UK’s UCU) send out lists of available CPD sessions where members can catch-up on the latest equality, diversity and inclusion (EDI) discourse, and understanding ‘intersectionality’ now features prominently.  Furthermore, whilst the large interdisciplinary social science foundation course I teach for the UK’s Open University (OU) was first published with no mention of ‘intersectionality’ in 2014, a recent ‘makeover’ and ‘update’ in 2022 added the concept – course writers clearly felt it had to be added in.  Clearly, I was not alone in my previous (pre-2019) ignorance.

Conceptual Fashion

These examples demonstrate the concept’s ‘currency’ and ‘essentiality’ when teaching entry level social science students – ‘we’ (the academy) need to teach this because how could ‘they’ (the students) not possibly know about intersectionality?   This is the case even if the concept might not (yet) have centrality within the teaching materials and course design.  Hence, the ‘addition’ or ‘add on’ approach.  That is, in the OU course, intersectionality is housed within a broader section on ‘identities’, sociology of identity, and identity politics, rather than being a core concept to the entire course.

As a tutor, my experience of intersectionality’s introduction to new students, and/or its adoption by more experienced students, has not (so far) been inspiring.  Namely, intersectionality is not being understood nor applied properly (to my mind, nor others!), and what I have witnessed is the dangers any sociological concept faces when gaining rapid universal adoption – it faces being misapplied and misunderstood as it is transformed into new ‘contexts’ (not considered by a concept’s originators).  Again, it is not just ‘me’ who has discovered this, since intersectionality also features in YouTube videos aiming to explain ‘why’ the term is not applicable to certain ‘groups’ (e.g. white women ‘allies’ who only have ONE element of discrimination – gender – and not TWO)!

I admit to being no expert in the field of ‘intersectionality’, but I can sum up what I take to be the original intention.  Crenshaw’s classic example refers to a black woman being unable to find employment because: (a) only white women work in the office while; (b) only men work on the factory floor.  Thus, a black man can get a job on the floor and a white woman a job in the office, but a black woman is unable to obtain either job.  The black woman falls foul of both forms of identity discrimination, related to race and gender.  Her dual identity (as black and as a woman) compounds her experience, demonstrating how different identities ‘intersect’.  The concept came from the United States where ‘crossroads’ are commonly known as ‘intersections’.

Here comes the reality!

But now for a couple of educator experiences on the arrival of ‘intersectionality’ in some alternate contexts.  I was teaching on an Honours level course which does not itself feature nor mention ‘intersectionality’, but where students are being encouraged to undertake an independent literature review.  The students are expected to develop a synopsis for a project and then develop a literature review (though they do not go on to do any primary research).  They have to combine theories from the course (such as attachment theory and actor-network theory used by sociologists) with their own subject ‘content’ and also make reference to recent (up-to-date) academic journal articles (and relevant contemporary approaches). 

Somewhere along the line, one of my students had come across ‘intersectionality’ and decided to use this contemporary concept within their project.  Yet, the content and focus of the project was on animal welfare, veganism, and hegemonic masculinity.  Consequently, part of the project proposal homed in on ‘the intersectionality of a chicken’!  It turns out that a female chicken is doubly exploited for her meat (being a chicken) and for her eggs (being a female chicken).  Cockerels need not worry about the latter form of exploitation, and intersectionality is not applicable to them.  My advice to the student was that ‘intersectionality’ was not the best conceptual tool for their specific project, and that it would be better to drop its usage!

Considering the concept of ‘intersectionality’ is rooted in identity politics I don’t think Crenshaw would be too impressed with the extension of her concept to the world of chickens.  After all, do chickens have ‘identities’, even if ‘we’ (humans) identify ‘them’ with resources such as meat and eggs?  Is the chicken more of a symbol, or signifier (to use an alternate concept), as opposed to sitting at the ‘intersection’ of its very own multiple possible ‘identities’?

Misinterpretation and misapplication aside, there is then the thorny issue of ineffective teaching.   Not mine, I might add, but via mass online distance-learning materials.  This is something I experience on the OU foundation level course, where ‘intersectionality’ has been ‘tacked on’.  Probably because the concept is, simply, ‘in vogue’.  Intersectionality is deemed something that has to be ‘talked about’ and not left out but, nonetheless, what good is this aim if the process is not given the necessary space for proper consideration and consolidation but also criticism?

In introducing the sociology of ‘identities’, the OU course uses the case study of sectarianism in Northern Ireland.  This is presented as a ‘single’ identity issue (the division between ‘British’ unionists and ‘Irish’ nationalists) and the concept of an interface space (where the two communities rub-up against each other) is referred to (e.g. Belfast’s Peace Walls).  Of course, many foundation students soon have the two communities ‘intersecting’ rather than ‘interfacing’, and try to apply the concept of ‘intersectionality’ (which requires two identities: black, woman) when only ONE identity division is being covered.  The confusion appears to pivot on what is meant by an ‘identity’: (a) a position within a polarised divide (so white and black are two different identities); or (b) the division itself, such that age, race, gender, sexuality, and economic class are the ‘different’ identities being discussed.

There is a sense in which the concept of ‘intersectionality’ should be applicable to the jobless working-class Irish-nationalist who is doubly disadvantaged by having two ‘negative’ identities (as far as the social history of Northern Ireland is concerned) compared to the middle-class Irish-nationalist.  Make the working-class Irish-nationalist a woman and we even have a 3-dimensional figure, with elevator-polarity in addition to horizontal ‘crossroads’.  But do such examples ever work quite as well or in the same way as Crenshaw’s original American-culture example?  Significantly, what are the limits (in terms of application) of the concept of ‘intersectionality’?

Intersectionality – It’s not for you!

When I teach students about social science ‘theory’ I try to emphasise two important aspects of theories.  First, universal theories about humans don’t necessarily tell us much about actual humans because the humans in question are the product of a highly specific social context.  For instance, people motivated by money are produced in a society dominated by money – and ‘money love’ is not a universal human trait.  Obviously money is a socio-historical creation and not part of ‘nature’.  Second, theories exist for a purpose – they have to be ‘useful’ to people.  I give the example of a joiner / carpenter (since this was my own father’s trade).  The joiner’s toolbox contains a hammer, saw and chisel.  If the joiner were to choose a saw to hammer a nail into a wall the customer would be bemused – they would note that this is the ‘wrong tool’ for the job at hand.

So it is with social sciences.  Some theories, such as prices being determined by ‘supply and demand’ are not only ‘bland’, making sweeping statements in relation to ‘scarcity’ which exists in ALL earthly human societies, but also ‘useless’ as they don’t explain why ‘scarcity’ exists in our (capitalist) society.  Food can be in abundance in a capitalist society and there still will be hunger and even starvation (as noted by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations or Mike Davis in his Late Victorian Holocausts).  We need better and more specific theories to interpret and understand scarcity in a capitalist society.  The wrong tools lead to a poor understanding and pieces of research or analytical work.

But how does ‘intersectionality’ measure up?  As the YouTube videos promoting intersectionality note, it is not something a white woman can claim to ‘suffer’ the consequences of, unless she happens to (also) have an LGBTQi ‘identity’ – another plane in which she exists.  If she happens to be ‘hetero’ and ‘cis’ then she does not have ‘intersectional’ status.  But as noted above, it didn’t take long for ‘everyone’  to get in on the act and start making claims about their own ‘intersectional’ status!  Even the committed vegan (and male standing against hegemonic masculinity) wanted to push the concept on a proxy basis for the victim of their consideration (chickens).

Of course, if the status of being ‘intersectional’ only applies to a minority of people in what sense is the concept an ‘applicable’ tool for the rest (the majority)?  Well, don’t they become the ‘privileged’ in so far as they do not ‘suffer’ the consequences of intersectionality?  Doesn’t the theory make their role one of ‘ally’ (restricted to aiming for the Best Supporting Actor Oscar)?  At the same time, they are ‘called upon’ to do something about their own ‘privileges’, especially in becoming ‘aware’ of the concept of intersectionality (often by misusing Raymond Williams’ concept of unlearning).  Because how can ‘we’ change the situation, the world, without being aware of the problem, and that ‘we’ are the problem (not just part of it) because of our ‘privileges’?

Intersectionality, as a concept, has its social role to play and, also, I do not deny the dialectical situation of labour being the source of the labourer’s own subordination to capital (a la Holloway or Bonefeld) – that ‘we’ are our own problem and our own solution.  But there is a need to come back to the question of the toolbox – when and where?

How effective is Intersectionality as a theoretical tool?

In Crenshaw’s originating example ‘skin colour’ was a major factor of the ‘concrete’ type of racism which evolved in the United States.  It is such a major factor in US life that Whoopi Goldberg ended up claiming the Holocaust was not a ‘racist’ act, but one of mere white-on-white violence!  Colourism (if I can call it that without causing offence) has become synonymous with racism (the key form racism takes in the US).  Skin-colour racism has also played a major role in other societies, such as France and Britain, and whilst writing this article Britain’s first Black MP, Diane Abbott, published a letter in the Guardian making similar claims to Goldberg – that Jews, Travellers and the Irish have not suffered racism all their lives, merely ‘prejudice’.  Criticising Goldberg’s and Abbott’s position does not mean skin-colour is to be ignored as a major factor in racism in societies other than the US (including Nazi Germany) but that the ‘major’ form racism takes can differ and often does.  In Rwanda and Bosnia it was ‘tribal’ and ‘ethnic’.  In Scotland, Ireland and Great Britain it was ‘cultural’ (Lallans versus Gaelic) and ‘religious’.  A first question then is ‘to whom’ does the concept of intersectionality apply in different contexts?  And quickly moving on, a second question is ‘to what proportion’ of the population does the concept apply?

The two questions are interrelated, hence a ‘context’ approach may be more useful.  In 2020, Black Americans made up 12.2% of the population, whilst Hispanic and Latino Americans made up 18.5%, and Asians 5.6%.  Additionally, Native American (0.7%) and Hawaiian (0.2%) made up another 1%, with 4.1% declaring themselves Mixed race.  If, for convenience, I treat all these groups as ‘people of color’ (POC), then POC accounted for 41.3% of the US population in 2020.  Divide this in half to give a rough estimate of ‘women of color’ (WOC) and one possible figure for individuals affected by colour-based ‘intersectionality’ in the US is 20.5% (one in five of the population).

By contrast, in Scotland, the last released Census (2011) gave the following figures: 96% of the population identified as White (84% White Scottish; 8% White British; leaving 4% as White Other); and 4% identified as Non-white, as either Asian (2.25%), African (0.56%), Black or Caribbean (0.12%), Mixed (0.37%) and Non-white Other (0.27%).  Taking the POC at 4%, then WOC make up 2% of the population.  This is a substantial difference from the situation in the US.  This does not mean that the concept of intersectionality is not meaningful to women of colour in Scotland and their allies.  It does not mean that inequality issues (such as women of colour not having the same opportunities as white women) should be ignored or forgotten about.  But it does mean that the application of the concept using the same ‘categories’ does not make the same social sense.  Aren’t there more people to be concerned about, that it can be applied to?

What if the focal ‘category’ was shifted from skin-colour to LGBTQi categories?  In Scotland, under the same 2011 Census, 95% of the population identified as ‘Heterosexual or Straight’.  The LGBTQi population faces the same issue with regards to intersectionality as those of POC – if a man is white, male and gay (though not white, trans-male and gay) then they may not fall into an ‘intersectional’ population.  Gay white men can be ‘allies’ but can’t presume they are affected in an ‘intersectional’ manner.  Those affected by intersectionality may be larger than 50% of the LGBTQi total (the female-male divide is fairly predictable), but not by much.  This is still nowhere near the kind of percentage of population affected by intersectionality as in the US (20.5%).

If that kind of level of ‘impact’ has to be reached, then which categorical distinction in Scotland would have to be examined?  What, in this context, makes social sense?  Most likely it would be one of ‘white-on-white violence’ (to use Whoopi Goldberg’s terms).  Relating the issue to White ‘Other’ (white immigrants; or Roma /Travellers) would still produce very low figures (White Other = 4%; White Other women = 2%).  One possibility could be Scotland’s Irish population.  Roughly there are 800,000 Roman Catholics in Scotland (16% of population), with the majority coming from 19th century immigration and having an Irish background.  Hence, Irish-background women (of any colour) might be the largest group (400,000) affected in an ‘intersectional’ manner.  However, figures for Roman Catholicism and Irish do not neatly align.  Furthermore, much Irish immigration goes back 100-160 years and many people will now consider themselves ‘White Scottish’ since they are fourth, fifth, or sixth generation.

Why is this important?  Marx on The Jewish Question

My criticisms here relate to the standard issue of what is being crowded out?  With the rise of one thought in our public ‘brain’ (discussion) other thoughts simply get squeezed out.  There are 250,000 children living in poverty in Scotland.  Some of these children will face poverty due to the unfair treatment of their parents and, hence, intersectionality affecting their mother will play a role in the children’s poverty.  I can add to this evidence that POC are more likely to suffer poverty (using the Scottish Government’s BAME definition).  This is a statistical likelihood.  Hence, to say POC children are more ‘likely’ to be brought up in poverty is a ‘true’ statement.  However, given the characteristics of Scotland’s general population (96% identifying as ‘White’) the vast majority of children in poverty are ‘White’ and are not affected by concerns of intersectionality – a small number of children out of the total will have mothers (meeting the gender identity element) who are also Black or Lesbian (as examples).

This context reminded me of Marx’s 1840s paper On the Jewish Question.  This is a much misunderstood work as I have seen Marx accused of being anti-Semitic because of it.  For those who don’t know, both of Marx’s grandfathers had been Jewish Rabbis, though his father was  forced to convert to Christianity as Prussian laws at the time stated lawyers had to be Christian.  What upsets some are that Marx appears to argue against the emancipation of the Jews.  Those advocating for change, such as Bruno Bauer, where arguing to give Jews equal legal status with Christians, such that government posts would be open to Jews without the need to ‘convert’.  This would bring about legal equality for the Jewish population, in line with the ‘republics’ of the United States and France, which had no state religion.   Bauer argued that the Prussian state (headed by a Christian monarch) was not like those of the US and France, and the desired social change (on the Jewish question) would require a much wider overthrow of the old state (otherwise the ’emancipation of the Jews’ wouldn’t make sense).

Marx, in turn, was criticising Bauer’s assertion that the overthrow of the religious state would make the essential difference.  Marx was not arguing against Jewish emancipation but the notion that freedom could be brought about by ‘legal’ means in the form of the liberal (property-owning) ‘rights of man’ (the constitution of a new political state).   More interestingly, Marx ties the emancipation of the Jews to the emancipation of all from economic servitude within civil society – the realm of commodity exchange.  Marx’s question here is ‘what would be the point of giving Jews legal equality when we already know, via the American and French Revolutions, that this outcome does nothing about social inequality?  As such, even with their new found ‘legal equality’ the vast majority of Jews (and majority of others) would find themselves oppressed by their isolation within and domination by markets and money.

In such a situation, when particular wrongs have been replaced by wrong-in-general (Marx’s formulation), the notion of a hierarchy of oppression (or negative-archy of the ‘most oppressed’), as in the feudal state, no longer makes sense.  Marx, unlike Max Weber, did not see ‘social class’ as different groups of people jostling for ‘market positionality’ or ‘social status’ (see Gunn’s 1987 ‘Notes on Class’).  The proletariat are defined as a ‘class’ (mode of production) which brings about the end of ‘class’ (as a form of social status).  Dividing people by levels of oppression doesn’t really question the source of oppression.

Conclusion

If we want to liberate people from the deleterious effects of ‘intersectionality’ then shouldn’t we do this by liberating everyone (ourselves included) from the oppression of commodification, from ‘money’ (capital)?  And how do we do that?  Crenshaw’s original example was about ensuring black women have equal access to or opportunity in finding ‘jobs’, but she doesn’t take criticism much further; from Marx’s perspective that is tantamount to arguing for an equal opportunity to be exploited.  How do we question the ‘scarcity of everything’ argument (because someone’s always going to come bottom) and tackle the real source of social division and inequality – the forced sale and purchase of labour power?